Peak oil is the theoretical point in time when the maximum level of petroleum extraction is reached, after which it is expected to enter the terminal decline. The top oil theory is based on the rise, peak, fall, and decimation of the aggregate production rate in oil fields over time. This is often confused with the depletion of oil; However, while depletion refers to periods of decline in reserves and inventories, peak oil refers to the peak, before terminal depletion occurs. The concept of peak oil is often credited to the geologist M. King Hubbert whose 1956 paper first presented formal theory.
Some observers, such as petroleum industry experts Kenneth S. Deffeyes and Matthew Simmons, predicted there would be a negative global economic effect after post-peak production cuts and subsequent oil price increases due to the continuing dependence of most modern industrial, agricultural and system transport low cost industries and high oil availability. Predictions vary greatly as to what exactly these negative effects are. While the idea that petroleum production should reach its peak at some point is not controversial, the assertion that this must coincide with a serious economic slowdown, or even that a decrease in production will be due to the depletion of available reserves, is not universally accepted.
Estimates of oil production where peak oil prediction is based are sometimes made in the range that includes optimistic scenarios (higher production) and pessimistic (lower production). A 2013 study concludes that peak oil "appears likely before 2030," and that there is "significant risk" that will occur before 2020, and it is assumed that large investments in alternatives will occur before the crisis, without requiring major lifestyle changes. countries that are very rich in oil. The pessimistic prediction of future oil production made after 2007 suggests that a peak has occurred, that oil production is at its peak, or that it will happen soon.
Hubbert's original prediction that US peak oil will occur sometime around 1970 seems accurate, as the average annual US production peaked in 1970 at 9.6 million barrels per day and largely declined for over 3 decades thereafter. However, the use of hydraulic fractures led to US production to rebound during 2000, challenging the inevitability of post-peak decline for US oil production. In addition, Hubbert's original prediction for world's top oil production proved too early. Nevertheless, the rate of discovery of new oil deposits peaked around the world during the 1960s and has never come close to this level since.
Video Peak oil
Modeling global oil production
The idea that the rate of oil production will reach the peak and the irreversible setback is the old one. In 1919, David White, chief geologist of the US Geological Survey, wrote of US petroleum: "... the peak of production will soon pass, perhaps in 3 years." In 1953, Eugene Ayers, a researcher for Gulf Oil, projected that if the US recoverable oil reserves were 100 billion barrels, then production in the US would peak no more than 1960. If recovered eventually reached as high as 200 billion barrels, what he warned was the US peak production will come no later than 1970. Likewise for the world, it projects a peak somewhere between 1985 (one trillion barrels of recoverable end) and 2000 (two trillion barrels can be recovered). Ayers makes projection without mathematical models. He writes: "But if the curve is made to look plausible, it is quite possible to adjust the mathematical expressions to it and to determine, in this way, the peak date corresponds to the various final recoverable reserve numbers"
Observing past inventions and levels of production, and predicting the trend of future discoveries, the geoscience of M. King Hubbert used statistical modeling in 1956 to predict accurately that US oil production would peak between 1965 and 1971. Hubbert used a semi-logistic model which is curved (sometimes wrong compared to the normal distribution). He assumes the production rate of the limited resources will follow a symmetrical distribution. Depending on the limits of exploitability and market pressure, increases or decreases in resource production over time may be sharper or more stable, looking more linear or curvy. The model and its variants are now called Hubbert's top theory; they have been used to describe and predict peaks and production declines from regional, state, and multinational areas. The same theory has also been applied to the production of other limited resources.
More recently, the term "peak oil" was popularized by Colin Campbell and Kjell Aleklett in 2002 when they helped to form the Association for the Study of Oil and Gas Peaks (ASPO). In his publications, Hubbert uses the terms "peak production level" and "peak in discovery level".
In the 2006 analysis of Hubbert's theory, it was noted that the uncertainty in the amount of real world oil production and confusion in the definition increased the general uncertainty of production predictions. Comparing the suitability of the various other models, it was found that Hubbert's method produced the closest match of all, but no model was highly accurate. In 1956 Hubbert himself recommended using a "family of possible production curves" when predicting peak production and declining curves.
A comprehensive 2009 study on oil thinning by the UK Energy Research Center noted:
Some analysts now follow a symmetrical bell-shaped production curve. This is true, since there is no natural physical reason why resource production should follow the curve and little empirical evidence like that.
The report notes that Hubbert has used the logistics curve because it is mathematically convenient, not because he really believes it to be true. This study observes that in many cases, asymmetric exponential models provide better matchability, and that peaks tend to occur well before half the oil is produced, with the result that in almost all cases, post-peak decline is more gradual than a peak-leading increase.
Maps Peak oil
Request
The peak demand side of oil peaks from time to time relates to the total amount of oil the global market chooses with various possible market prices and how this entire quantity list at various prices will evolve over time. Global demand for crude oil grew an average of 1.76% per year from 1994 to 2006, with a 3.4% high growth in 2003-2004. After reaching a high of 85.6 million barrels (13,610,000 m 3 ) per day in 2007, world consumption declined in 2008 and 2009 by a total of 1.8%, although fuel costs fell in 2008 Despite this pause, the world demanded for oil is projected to increase 21% compared to 2007 levels by 2030 (104 million barrels per day (16.5 ÃÆ'â ⬠" 10 ^ 6 m 3 /d) of 86 million barrels (13.7 ÃÆ'â ⬠" 10 6 m 3 )), or about 0 , 8% average annual growth, largely due to increased demand from the transport sector. According to projections by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 2013, global oil demand growth will be significantly surpassed by growth in production capacity over the next 5 years. Developments by the end of 2014-2015 have seen an oversupply of global markets leading to a significant decline in oil prices.
Energy demand is distributed among four major sectors: transport, housing, commercial, and industrial. In terms of oil usage, transportation is the largest sector and one that has experienced the greatest demand growth in recent decades. This growth comes largely from new demand for private vehicles powered by internal combustion engines. This sector also has the highest consumption rate, accounting for about 71% of the oil used in the United States by 2013. and 55% of worldwide oil usage as documented in the Hirsch report. Therefore, transportation is very attractive to those who seek to reduce the impact of peak oil.
Despite the highest demand growth in developing countries, the United States is the world's largest petroleum consumer. Between 1995 and 2005, US consumption grew from 17.7 million barrels per day (2,810,000 m 3 /d) to 20.7 million barrels per day (3,290,000 m 3 /d), a 3,000,000 barrel per day (480,000 m 3 /d) increases. China, by comparison, increased consumption from 3,400,000 barrels per day (540,000 m 3 /d) to 7,000,000 barrels per day (1,100,000 m 3 /d ), an increase of 3,600,000 barrels per day (570,000 m 3 /d), within the same time frame. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) states that the use of gasoline in the United States may have peaked in 2007, partly due to increased interest and mandates for biofuels and energy efficiency.
As the country's development, industry and higher living standards increase energy use, oil use becomes a major component. Developing economies, such as China and India, are rapidly becoming big oil consumers. For example, China surpassed the United States as the world's largest crude oil importer by 2015. Growth in oil consumption is expected to continue; However, not at the previous level, as China's economic growth is predicted to decline from the high level of the early part of the 21st century. India's oil imports are expected to increase more than triple from 2005 levels by 2020, rising to 5 million barrels per day (790 Æ' 103 m 3 /d).
Population
Another significant factor affecting petroleum demand is the growth of the human population. The US Census Bureau predicts that the world population in 2030 will be almost twice that of 1980. Per capita oil production peaked in 1979 by 5.5 barrels/year but then declined to fluctuate around 4.5 barrels per year since then. In this case, the rate of declining population growth since the 1970s has somewhat improved the per capita decline.
Economic growth
Some analysts argue that the cost of oil has a profound effect on economic growth because of its important role in resource extraction and processing, manufacturing, and transportation of goods. As industry efforts to extract new non-conventional oil sources increase, this has a negative effect of compounding on all sectors of the economy, leading to economic stagnation or even contraction. Such a scenario would result in the inability of the national economy to pay for high oil prices, leading to a decrease in demand and collapse in prices.
Supply
Our analysis shows there is a lot of physical oil and liquid fuel resources for the foreseeable future. However, the rate at which new inventory can be developed and the breakeven price for the new inventory changes.
Specify an oil source
Oil may come from conventional or unconventional sources. The terms are not strictly defined, and vary in literature because the definitions based on new technology tend to change over time. As a result, various oil forecasting studies have included various classes of liquid fuels. Some use the term "conventional" oil for what is included in the model, and "unconventional" oil for the class is excluded.
In 1956, Hubbert limited his top oil predictions with crude oil "which can be produced by the method now used." However, in 1962, his analysis included an increase in exploration and production in the future. All Hubbert's analysis of special peak oils excludes oil produced from oil shales or mined from oil sands. A 2013 study that foresees an early peak including deep-sea oil, tight oil, oil with API gravity of less than 17.5, and oil close to the poles, such as on the North Slope of Alaska, all of which are defined as non-conventional. Some definitions commonly used for conventional and non-conventional oils are described below.
Conventional sources
Conventional oils are extracted onshore and offshore using standard techniques, and can be categorized as light, medium, heavy, or extra weight classes. The exact definition of these values ââvaries depending on the region of origin of the oil. Light oil flows naturally to the surface or can be extracted simply by pumping it out of the ground. Weight refers to oils that have a higher density and hence lower the gravity of the API. It does not flow easily, and its consistency is similar to molasses. While some of these can be produced using conventional techniques, recovery rates are better using unconventional methods.
Unconventional sources
Oil currently considered unconventional comes from various sources.
- Hard oil is extracted from low-permeability rock deposits, sometimes shale deposits but often other rock types, using hydraulic fractures, or "fracking". This is often confused with shale oil, which is an oil produced from kerogens contained in oil shale (see below), The tight oil production has led to a revival of US production in recent years. US crude oil production peaked in March 2015, and fell by a total of 12 percent over the next 18 months. But then tighter US oil production rose again, and in September 2017 had already surpassed the old peak, and in October 2017, tight US oil production was still rising.
- Shale oil is a generic term for sedimentary rocks such as shale or napal, containing kerogen, a precursor of wax oil that has not been converted into crude oil by high pressure and temperature caused by deep burial. The term "oil shale" is somewhat confusing, because what is called in the US as "oil shale" is not really the oil and stone it finds in general not shale. Because it is closer to the surface than buried deep inside the earth, shale or napal is usually mined, crushed, and pulled, producing synthetic oils of kerogen. The net energy yield is much lower than that of conventional oil, so much so that net energy yield estimates from the discovery of flakes are considered very unreliable.
- Oil sand is an unconsolidated sandstone precipitate containing large amounts of highly viscous raw asphalt or extractable heavy crude oil with surface mining or in-situ oil wells using steam injection or other techniques. This can be melted by updating, incorporating with a thinner, or by heating; and then processed by a conventional oil refinery. The recovery process requires advanced technology but is more efficient than oil shale. The reason is that, unlike the "oil splinters" of the US, Canadian oil sands actually contain oil, and the sandstones they find are much easier to produce oil than shale or napal. In the English dialect of the U.S., this formation is often called "tar sand", but the material found in it is not tar but the form of extra heavy and viscous oil is technically known as bitumen.
- Liquid or liquid liquefaction for liquid products is liquid hydrocarbons synthesized from the conversion of coal or natural gas by the Fischer-Tropsch process, Bergius process, or the Karrick process. Currently, two companies SASOL and Shell, have synthetic oil technology that is proven to work on a commercial scale. Sasol's main business is based on CTL (coal-to-liquid) technology and GTL (natural gas-to-liquid), generating revenues of US $ 4.40 billion (FY2009). Shell has used this process to recycle the flue gas waste (usually burned in oil wells and oil refineries) into usable synthetic oil. However, for CTL there may not be enough coal reserves to supply global demand for both liquid fuel and power generation.
- Small sources include thermal depolymerization, as discussed in the 2003 article in Discover of the magazine, which can be used to produce unlimited oil, from waste, waste, and agricultural waste. The article claims that the cost of the process is $ 15 per barrel. A follow-up article in 2006 states that the cost is actually $ 80 per barrel, since raw materials previously regarded as hazardous waste now have market value. A news bulletin 2008 published by Los Alamos Laboratory proposes that hydrogen (possibly produced using hot liquids from nuclear reactors to break water into hydrogen and oxygen) in combination with the alienated CO 2 can be used to produce methanol ( CH 3 OH), which can then be converted into gasoline.
Discovery
All the easy oil and gas in the world have been found. Now comes the hard work of finding and producing oil from more challenging environments and work areas.
It is quite clear that there is not much opportunity to find a significant amount of new low-cost oil. Any new or unconventional oil will be expensive.
The peak of the world oilfield invention occurred in the 1960s around 55 billion barrels (8,7 ÃÆ' - 10 9 m 3 ) (Gb)/year. According to the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (ASPO), the rate of discovery has fallen steadily ever since. Less than 10 Gb/year of oil is found annually between 2002 and 2007. According to the Reuters 2010 article, the annual rate of discovery of new fields remains very constant at 15-20 Gb/year.
But despite a decline in new field discoveries, and record levels of high production, proven reserves of crude oil remaining on the ground in 2014, totaling 1,490 billion barrels, excluding Canadian heavy oil sands, more than quadrupled 1965 proving reserves of 354 billion barrel. A researcher for the US Energy Information Administration has demonstrated that after the first discovery wave in an area, most of the oil and gas reserves originate not from the discovery of new fields, but from extensions and additional gases found in the existing field.
A report by the UK Energy Research Center notes that "discovery" is often used ambiguously, and explains the contradiction between the rate of discovery that has declined since 1960 and the increase in reserves by the phenomenon of reserve growth. The report notes that an increase in reserves in a field can be discovered or developed by new technologies for years or decades after original discovery. But because of the practice of "backdating," every new reserve in a field, even discovered several decades after the field invention, is associated with the year of initial field discovery, creating the illusion that the invention is not in line with production.
Backup
The total probability of conventional crude oil reserves including crude oil with 90% certainty can technically be produced from reservoirs (through drill holes using primary, secondary, improved, enhanced, or tertiary methods); all crude oil with a 50% probability produced in the future (possibly); and find a reserve that has a 10% chance of being produced in the future (possibly). Estimated reserves based on this are referred to as 1P, proven (at least 90% probability); 2P, proven and possible (at least 50% probability); and 3P, proven, probable and probable (at least 10% probability), respectively. This excludes liquids extracted from solids or mined gases (oil sands, oil shales, gas-to-liquid processes, or coal-to-liquid processes).
Hubbert's peak projections in 1956 for the United States depended on the geological estimate of recoverable oil resources, but beginning in 1962, he concluded that the final oil recovery was the result of his mathematical analysis, not an assumption. He considers his top oil calculations as independent of reserve estimates.
Many current 2P calculations predict the reserves are between 1150 and 1350 Gb, but some authors have written that due to misinformation, retained information, and misleading reserve calculations, 2P reserves tend to be closer to 850-900 Gb. The Energy Watch Group writes that actual reserves peaked in 1980, when the first production surpassed the new discovery, that the apparent increase in reserves since then was an illusion, and concluded (in 2007): "Perhaps world oil production has peaked, but we can not Of course. "
Concerns over expressed reserves
The [world] reserve is confusing and even increasing. Many of the so-called real reserves are resources. They are not described, they are inaccessible, they are not available for production.
Sadad Al Husseini estimates that 300 billion barrels (9 9 9
One difficulty in forecasting peak oil dates is the opacity around the "proven" oil reserves. In many major producing countries, most reserve claims are not subject to external audits or checks. A lot of alarming signs about the lack of proven reserves have emerged in recent years. This is best exemplified by the 2004 scandal surrounding "evaporation" of 20% of Shell's reserves.
For the most part, proven reserves are declared by oil companies, producing countries and consumer countries. All three have reasons to overestimate their proven reserves: oil companies may look to increase their potential value; producer countries gain stronger international status; and governments of consumer countries can look for ways to foster security and stability sentiment in their economies and among consumers.
The big difference comes from the problem of accuracy with self-reported figures from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In addition to the possibility that these countries have overstated their reserves for political reasons (during periods of no substantial discovery), more than 70 countries also followed the practice of not reducing their reserves to account for annual production. Analysts have suggested that OPEC member countries have economic incentives to exaggerate their reserves, as OPEC's quota system allows greater output for countries with larger reserves.
Kuwait, for example, reported in the January 2006 issue of Petroleum Intelligence Weekly has only 48 billion barrels (7,6 ÃÆ'â ⬠10 9 Ã, m 3 ) in the backup, of which only 24 are fully proven. This report is based on leaked confidential documents from Kuwait and has not been formally rejected by Kuwaiti authorities. This leaked document originated in 2001, but does not include revisions or inventions made since then. In addition, it was reported that 1.5 billion barrels (240 ÃÆ'â ⬠10 6 m 3 ) oil burned by the Iraqi army in the First Persian Gulf War was prominently lost from Kuwaiti figures.
On the other hand, investigative journalist Greg Palast argues that oil companies have an interest in making oil look more scarce than that, to justify higher prices. This view was opposed by ecological journalist Richard Heinberg. Other analysts argue that oil-producing countries shrink their reserve levels to raise prices.
EUR reported by USGS 2000 survey of 2,300 billion barrels (370 ÃÆ'â ⬠" 10 Unusual oil reserves
As conventional oil becomes less available, it can be replaced by liquid production from unconventional sources such as tight oil, oil sands, ultra-heavy oil, gas-to-liquid technology, rock-to-liquid technology, biofuel technology, and flakes. oil. In the next edition of the 2007 International Energy Outlook, the word "Oil" was replaced by "Liquid" in the world energy consumption chart. In 2009, biofuels were put in "Fluid" and not in "Renewable". The inclusion of natural gas liquids, bi-products from natural gas extraction, in "Liquids" has been criticized because most of the chemical raw materials are generally not used as transportation fuels.
The reserve estimates are based on the price of oil. Therefore, unconventional sources such as heavy crude oil, oil sands, and oil shales may be included as new techniques reduce extraction costs. With regulatory changes by the SEC, oil companies can now order them as proven reserves after opening strip mines or thermal facilities for extraction. These unconventional sources have more labor and intensive resources to produce, however, require extra energy to improve, resulting in higher production costs and up to three times more greenhouse gas emissions per barrel (or barrel equivalent) on "either to the tank" base or 10 to 45% more on a "good to the wheel" basis, which includes the carbon emitted from the burning of the final product.
While the energy used, the resources required, and the environmental effects of the extraction of unconventional sources have traditionally been very high, the major non-conventional oil resources to be considered for large-scale production are extra-heavy oils in the Venezuelan Orinoco Belt, Sands Athabasca Oil in the West Canada Sediment Basin, and the Green River Formation oil shale in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming in the United States. Energy companies such as Syncrude and Suncor have been extracting bitumens for decades but production has increased rapidly in recent years with the development of Steam Drainage Gravity Drainage and other extraction technologies.
USGS Chuck Masters estimates that, "Taken together, the incidence of this resource, in the Western Hemisphere, is approximately equal to the unidentified Reserves of conventional crude oil accredited to the Middle East." Authorities familiar with resources believe that the world's largest non-conventional oil reserves are several times larger than conventional oil and will be highly beneficial to firms as a result of higher prices in the 21st century. In October 2009, the USGS renewed the restored Orinoco (Venezuela) tar sands of "average value" to 513 billion barrels (8.16 ÃÆ' - 10 10 m 3 ), with a 90% chance of being in the range of 380-652 billion barrels (103,7 ÃÆ'â ⬠"span> 10 9 m 3 ), making this area "one of the world's largest recoverable oil accumulations".
Although large amounts of oil are available in non-conventional sources, Matthew Simmons argued in 2005 that production restrictions prevented him from becoming an effective substitute for conventional crude. Simmons stated "this is a high energy intensity project that can never achieve high volume" to offset significant losses from other sources. Another study claims that even under a very optimistic assumption, "Canadian oil sands will not prevent peak oil," although production could reach 5,000,000 bbl/d (790,000 m 3 /d) by 2030 in the "crash program" business development.
In addition, oil extracted from these sources usually contains contaminants such as sulfur and heavy metals that are wasteful of energy to extract and can leave tailings, ponds containing hydrocarbon sludge, in some cases. The same applies to most undeveloped conventional Middle East oil reserves, which are mostly heavy, viscous, and contaminated with sulfur and metals until they can no longer be used. However, high oil prices make these sources more financially attractive. A study by Wood Mackenzie shows that in the early 2020s, all the extra world supply of oil probably came from unconventional sources.
Production
The point in time when peak global oil production occurs defines peak oil. Some 'top oil' believe that production capacity will remain a major limitation of supply, and when production declines, it will be a major obstacle to petroleum supply/demand equation. Others believe that increasing industrial efforts to extract oil will have a negative effect on global economic growth, leading to contractionary demand and price collapse, resulting in a decline in production as some unconventional sources become uneconomical. Yet others believe that the peak may be to some extent led by declining demand as new technologies and increase efficiency divert energy use from oil.
The discovery of oil around the world has been less than the annual production since 1980. The world population has grown faster than oil production. Therefore, oil production per capita peaked in 1979 (preceded by the highlands during the period 1973-1979).
Increased investment in oil more difficult to achieve in 2005 is said to mark the confidence of oil companies at the end of easy oil. Although it is widely believed that rising oil prices spur increased production, an increase in the number of people in the oil industry reportedly came to believe in 2009 that even with higher prices, oil production would not increase significantly. Among the reasons mentioned are geological factors as well as "above ground" factors that tend to see the highlands of oil production.
The 2008 Journal of Energy Security's analysis of energy returns on drilling efforts (energy generated from invested energy, also referred to as EROEI) in the United States concludes that there is a very limited potential to increase both gas production and (particularly ) oil. Looking at the historical response of production to variations in the drilling effort, the analysis showed very little increase in production due to increased drilling. This is due to diminishing returns with increasing drilling efforts: as drilling efforts increase, the energy obtained per active drilling rig decreases according to the law of greatly reduced strength. The study concludes that even large increases in drilling efforts are unlikely to significantly increase oil and gas production in mature petroleum areas such as the United States. However, contrary to the conclusions of the study, since analysis was published in 2008, US crude oil production has increased 86%, and the production of dry natural gas has increased 34% (2015 compared with 2008).
The assumption of the inevitable decline in oil and gas volumes generated per business unit is contrary to recent experience in the US. In the United States, by 2017, there has been a continuous increase in oil and gas drilling productivity in all tightening oil and gas tightening. The US Energy Information Administration reports, for example, that in the Bakken Shale production area in North Dakota, the volume of oil produced per rig drilling time in January 2017 was 4 times the oil volume per drilling day five years earlier, in January 2012, and nearly 10 times volume of oil per day ten years earlier, in January 2007. In the Marcellus gas region in the northeast, the volume of gas produced per day of drilling time in January 2017 is 3 times the volume of gas per day drilling five years earlier, in January 2012, and 28 times the volume of gas per drilling day ten years earlier, in January 2007.
Production anticipated by major agency
The average annual profit in global supply from 1987 to 2005 was 1.2 million barrels per day (190 ÃÆ'â ⬠10
In a 2013 study of 733 giant oilfields, only 32% of the oil can be recovered, condensate and gas remaining. Ghawar, which is the world's largest oil field and responsible for about half of Saudi Arabia's oil production over the last 50 years, declined before 2009. The world's second largest oil field, the Burgan Square in Kuwait, entered a decline in November. 2005.
Mexico announced that production from Cantarell Field giant began to decline in March 2006, reported at a rate of 13% per year. Also in 2006, Saudi Aramco Senior Vice President Abdullah Saif estimates that the existing field is declining at a rate of 5% to 12% per year. According to a study of the 811 largest oilfields conducted in early 2008 by Cambridge Energy Research Associates, the average rate of field decline was 4.5% per year. The Association for Peak Oil and Gas Studies agrees with their rate of decline, but considers the rate of new fields coming online too optimistic. The IEA declared in November 2008 that an analysis of 800 oil fields showed a decline in oil production to 6.7% per year for farms through its peak, and this would grow to 8.6% by 2030. The annual decline rate is faster than 5.1% % in the world's 800 largest oil fields that are weighted for their lifetime production are reported by the International Energy Agency in the World Energy Outlook 2008. The 2013 study of 733 previously mentioned giant fields has an average 3.83% drop rate described as "conservative."
Control supply
Entities such as governments or cartels can reduce supply to the world market by limiting access to supplies through oil nationalization, reducing production, limiting drilling rights, imposing taxes, etc. International sanctions, corruption, and military conflicts can also reduce supply.
Nationalization of oil supplies
Another factor affecting global oil supply is the nationalization of oil reserves by producing countries. The nationalization of oil occurs when the country begins to deplete oil production and curb exports. Kate Dourian, editor of Middle East Platts, points out that while estimates of oil reserves may vary, politics is now entering the equation of oil supplies. "Some countries are forbidden, big oil companies operating in Venezuela find themselves in a difficult position because of the increasing nationalization of these resources.These countries are now reluctant to share their reserves."
According to the consulting firm PFC Energy, only 7% of the world's oil and gas reserves estimate in countries that allow companies like ExxonMobil to release. Fully 65% ââare in the hands of state-owned companies such as Saudi Aramco, with the rest in countries like Russia and Venezuela, where access by Western European and North American companies is difficult. The PFC study implies that political factors limit capacity building in Mexico, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Russia. Saudi Arabia also limits capacity expansion, but because of its self-imposed hat, unlike other countries. As a result of not having access to countries that are willing to undertake oil exploration, ExxonMobil did not make nearly any investment in finding new oils made in 1981.
the effect of OPEC on supply
OPEC is an alliance between 14 different oil producing countries (as of May 2017: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela) to manage supply of oil. The strength of OPEC was consolidated in the 1960s and 1970s as various countries nationalized their oil holdings, and seized the decision of the Seven Sisters (Anglo-Iranian, Socony, Royal Dutch Shell, Gulf, Esso, Texaco, Socal), and created their own oil companies to control oil. OPEC often tries to influence prices by limiting production. This is done by allocating each quota member state to production. Members agree to keep prices high by producing at a lower rate than they should. There is no way to enforce compliance with quotas, so each member has an individual incentive to "cheat" the cartel.
Commodity trader Raymond Learsy, author of The Over a Barrel book, believes that OPEC has trained consumers to believe that oil is a much more limited resource than it is. To support his argument, he points to false alarms and clear collaborations. He also believes that top oil analysts have conspired with OPEC and oil companies to create a "top oil production drama" to raise oil prices and profits; Oil rose to slightly above $ 30/barrel at the time. A counter argument was given at Huffington Post after he and Steve Andrews, ASPO co-founder, debated on CNBC in June 2007.
Prediction
In 1962, Hubbert predicted that world oil production would peak at a rate of 12.5 billion barrels per year, around 2000. In 1974, Hubbert predicted that peak oil would occur in 1995 "if current trends continue". The prediction proved to be untrue. However, a number of industry leaders and analysts believe that world oil production will peak between 2015 and 2030, with a significant likelihood that the peak will occur before 2020. Those considering the date after 2030 make no sense. By comparison, 2014 analysis of production and reserve data estimates peak in oil production around 2035. Determining more specific ranges is difficult due to the lack of certainty over the true size of the world's oil reserves. Non-conventional oil is currently unpredictable to meet the expected shortcomings even in the best case scenario. For non-conventional oil to fill the gap without "serious impact on the global economy", oil production should remain stable after its peak, until 2035 the fastest.
Papers published since 2010 are relatively pessimistic. Study 2010 The University of Kuwait predicts production will peak in 2014. An Oxford University study 2010 estimates that production will peak before 2015, but the projected changes are soon "... from market-led demand to supply-limited markets.." not true. A 2014 validation of a significant 2004 study in the journal Energy suggests that the possibility of conventional oil production peaked, by various definitions, between 2005 and 2011. A set of models published in Ph 2014. D. thesis estimates that the 2012 peak will be followed by a fall in oil prices, which in some scenarios may turn into a rapid price increase thereafter. According to energy blogger Ron Patterson, the peak of world oil production may be around 2010.
Large oil companies reached peak production in 2005. Several sources in 2006 and 2007 estimated that worldwide production reached maximum or maximum. Fatih Birol, chief economist at the International Energy Agency, also stated that "world crude oil production has peaked in 2006." However, by 2013, OPEC figures show that world crude oil production and reserves remain at record highs. According to Matthew Simmons, former Chairman of Simmons & amp; International Company and author of Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and World Economy, "culminating is one of the obscure events you only know clearly when you look through the rearview mirror, and at that moment alternative resolution is generally too late. "
Possible consequences
The widespread use of fossil fuels has been one of the most important stimuli of economic growth and prosperity since the industrial revolution, allowing humans to participate in the removal, or consumption of energy to a greater extent than replaced. Some believe that when oil production declines, human culture and modern technological society will be forced to change drastically. The impact of peak oil will largely depend on the rate of decline and the development and adoption of an effective alternative.
In 2005, the US Department of Energy published a report entitled Peak World Oil Production: Impact, Mitigation & amp; Risk Management . Known as Hirsch's report, he states, "The peak of world oil production presents the US and the world with an unprecedented risk management problem.the peak, liquid fuel prices and price volatility will increase dramatically, and, without timely mitigation , economic, social and political costs will be unprecedented.Good mitigation options exist on both sides of supply and demand, but to have a substantial impact, they must start more than a decade before it culminates. "Some information has been updated in 2007.
Oil price
Historical oil prices
Oil prices have historically been relatively low until the 1973 oil crisis and the 1979 energy crisis when it increased more than tenfold over the six-year period. Although oil prices dropped significantly in subsequent years, it never returned to previous levels. Oil prices began to rise again during the 2000s to reach a historical altitude of $ 143 per barrel (2007 adjusted for inflation) on 30 June 2008. Because these prices were far above that caused the energy crisis in 1973 and 1979, they contributed to the fear of an economic recession similar to the early 1980s.
It is generally agreed that the main reason for the price spike in 2005-2008 is the strong demand pressure. For example, global oil consumption has increased from 30 billion barrels (4.8 ÃÆ'â ⬠10 9 Ã, m 3 ) in 2004 to 31 billion in 2005. The consumption level was well above the new discovery in that period, which had fallen to only eight billion barrels of new oil reserves in accumulation only in 2004.
The rise in oil prices was partly driven by reports that oil production was at or near full capacity. In June 2005, OPEC stated that it would 'struggle' to pump enough oil to meet price pressures for the fourth quarter of that year. From 2007 to 2008, the decline in the US dollar against other major currencies was also seen as a significant reason for the rise in oil prices, as the dollar lost about 14% of its value against the Euro from May 2007 to May 2008.
In addition to supply and demand pressures, sometimes security-related factors may have contributed to price increases, including the War on Terror, missile launches in North Korea, Crisis between Israel and Lebanon, nuclear turmoil between the US and Iran, and reports from the US Department of Energy and others show a decline in petroleum reserves.
Most recently, between 2011 and 2014, crude oil prices were relatively stable, fluctuating around $ 100 per barrel. This declines sharply by the end of 2014 to below $ US70 where it remains for most of 2015. In early 2016, it traded below $ 27. Price declines have been attributed to oversupply and declining demand as a result of the global economic slowdown, OPEC's reluctance to recognize market share, and a stronger US dollar. These factors can be compounded by a combination of monetary policy and increased oil producer debt, which can increase production to maintain liquidity.
This price reduction has put many US oil producers tight under considerable financial pressure. As a result, there is a reduction by oil companies in capital expenditure of more than US $ 400 billion. It is anticipated that this will have an effect on global production in the long term, leading to a statement of concern by the International Energy Agency that the government should not be negligent about energy security. The Energy Information Agency projection anticipates an oversupply of the market and prices below $ US50 by the end of 2017.
Influence of historical oil prices increases
In the past, a sudden rise in oil prices has led to an economic recession, such as the 1973 and 1979 energy crises. The effect of rising oil prices on the economy is known as price shocks. In many European countries, which have high taxes on fuel, such price shocks can potentially be reduced by suspending temporary taxes or permanently suspending fuel costs. This method of softening price shocks is less useful in countries with lower gas taxes, such as the United States. The basic scenario for an IMF paper recently found oil production to grow at 0.8% (compared with the historical average of 1.8%) will result in a small drop in economic growth of 0.2-0.4%.
Researchers at the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum found that the economy could adjust to a steady gradual rise in crude oil prices better than wild pride.
Some economists predict that substitution effects will spur demand for alternative energy sources, such as coal or liquefied natural gas. This substitution is only temporary, as coal and natural gas are also limited resources.
Prior to the fuel price hike, many motorists opted for bigger, less fuel-efficient sports vehicles, and full-size pickups in the United States, Canada and other countries. This trend has been reversed due to sustained high fuel prices. September 2005 sales data for all vehicle vendors showed sales of SUVs declining while small car sales increased. Hybrid and diesel vehicles are also increasingly popular.
EIA publishes Household Vehicles Energy Usage: Latest Data and Trends in November 2005 that describes a steady increase in disposable income and oil prices of $ 20-30 per barrel in 2004. The report noted "The average household spends $ 1,520 on purchase of fuel for transportation. " According to CNBC, costs rose to $ 4,155 in 2011.
In 2008, a report by Cambridge Energy Research Associates stated that 2007 was the year of top gasoline use in the United States, and that record energy prices would cause a "lasting shift" in energy consumption practices. The total miles traveled in the US peaked in 2006.
The Model of Export Lands states that after the peak oil exporting countries will be forced to reduce their exports faster than their production decreases due to the growth of internal demand. Countries that depend on imported oil will therefore be affected earlier and more dramatically than exporting countries. Mexico is already in this situation. Internal consumption grew by 5.9% in 2006 in the five largest exporting countries, and their exports declined by more than 3%. It is estimated that by 2010 internal demand will decrease world exports by 2,500,000 barrels per day (400,000 m 3 /d).
Canadian economist Jeff Rubin has stated that high oil prices are likely to result in increased consumption in developed countries through partial de-par for globalization. Manufacturing production will move closer to the final consumer to minimize the cost of the transport network, and therefore demand separated from gross domestic product will occur. Higher oil prices will lead to increased freight costs and consequently, the manufacturing industry will return to developed countries as shipping costs will outweigh the current economic wage gains from developing countries. Economic research conducted by the International Monetary Fund puts the overall price elasticity of oil demand at -0.025 short-term and -0.093 long-term.
Farming effects and population limits
Because oil and gas supplies are critical to modern farming techniques, the decline in global oil supplies could lead to an unprecedented spike in food and hunger prices in the coming decades. Geologist Dale Allen Pfeiffer argues that the current population level is not sustainable, and that to achieve a sustainable economy and prevent a catastrophe, the US population should be reduced by at least a third, and the world population by two-thirds.
The largest consumer of fossil fuels in modern agriculture is the production of ammonia (for fertilizer) through the Haber process, which is essential for high-intensity intensive agriculture. Feed specific fossil fuels for the production of fertilizers especially natural gas, to provide hydrogen through steam reform. Given the adequacy of renewable power supplies, hydrogen can be produced without fossil fuels using methods such as electrolysis. For example, the Vemork hydroelectric power plant in Norway uses surplus power output to produce renewable ammonia from 1911 to 1971.
Iceland currently produces ammonia using electricity output from geothermal and geothermal power plants, as Iceland has abundant resources while lacking domestic hydrocarbon resources, and high costs for importing natural gas.
Long-term effects on lifestyle
The majority of Americans live in the suburbs, a kind of low-density settlement designed for universal private car use. Commentators such as James Howard Kunstler argue that since more than 90% of US transportation depends on oil, suburban dependence on automobiles is an unsustainable setting of life. Peak oil will make many Americans unable to buy oil-based fuels for their cars, and force them to use bicycles or electric vehicles. Additional options include telecommuting, moving to rural areas, or moving to higher density areas, where walking and public transportation are a more viable option. In the latter two cases, the suburbs could be the "future slums." The problem of petroleum supply and demand is also a concern for emerging cities in developing countries (where urban areas are expected to absorb most of the world population growth projection of 2.3 billion by 2050). Emphasizing the energy component of future development plans is seen as an important goal.
Rising oil prices, if they occur, will also affect the cost of food, heating, and electricity. High stress levels will then be charged to lower middle-income families as the economy contracts from a drop in excess funds, thus lowering the unemployment rate. The Hirsch/US DoE Report concludes that "without timely mitigation, the world supply/demand balance will be achieved through massive destruction of demand (shortages), accompanied by huge increases in oil prices, both of which will create long periods of economic hardship significant worldwide. "
Recommended methods for reducing urban and suburban issues include the use of non-oil vehicles such as electric cars, battery electric vehicles, transit-oriented development, carfree cities, bicycles, new trains, new pedestrians, smart growth, shared space, consolidation urban, urban, and new urbanism.
An extensive 2009 report on the impact of compact development by the US National Research Council of the Academy of Sciences, commissioned by the United States Congress, states six major findings. First, the compact development is likely to reduce "Vehicle Miles Traveled" (VMT) across the country. Second, that doubling the density of housing in a given area can reduce the VMT by as much as 25% when combined with measures such as increased workload and increased public transport. Third, that higher density, mixed-use usage will result in direct reductions in CO 2 emissions (from less driving), and indirect reductions (such as from lower amounts of materials used per housing unit , higher climate control efficiency, longer vehicle life, and more efficient delivery of goods and services). Fourth, that although short-term reductions in energy use and CO 2 emissions will be simple, that these reductions will become more important over time. Fifth, that the main obstacle to more compact development in the United States is the political resistance of the local zoning regulator, which will hinder the efforts of state and local governments to participate in land-use planning. Sixth, the committee agrees that changes in development that will change the driving pattern and efficiency of the building will have various costs and secondary benefits that are difficult to quantify. The report recommends that policies that support the development of a compact (and especially its ability to reduce driving emissions, energy use, and CO 2 ) should be encouraged.
An economic theory that has been proposed as a drug is the introduction of a stable country economy. Such systems can include tax shifting from income to depleting natural resources (and pollution), as well as advertising restrictions that stimulate demand and population growth. It could also include policy institutions moving away from globalization and toward localization to conserve energy resources, provide local employment, and maintain local decision-making authority. Zoning policies can be adapted to promote resource conservation and eliminate sprawl.
As aviation relies primarily on jet fuel derived from crude oil, commercial aviation has been predicted to decline with global oil production.
Mitigation
To avoid serious social and economic implications, a global decline in oil production could occur, Hirsch's report emphasized the need to find alternatives, at least ten to twenty years before the summit, and to stop the use of oil at the time. This is similar to the proposed plan for Sweden in the same year. Such mitigation may include energy conservation, fuel substitution, and non-conventional oil use. Mitigation response time is very important. Premature initiation will be undesirable, but if it starts late it can be more expensive and have more negative economic consequences.
Positive aspects
Permaculture sees peak oil has great potential for positive change, assuming the state acts with foresight. The redevelopment of local food networks, energy production, and the general implementation of the "descendant culture of energy" are expressed as an ethical response to the recognition of limited fossil resources. Majorca is an island that currently diversifies its energy supply from fossil fuels to alternative sources and looks back on traditional construction and permaculture methods.
The Transition City Movement, started in Totnes, Devon and distributed internationally by "The Transition Handbook" (Rob Hopkins) and Transition Network, sees the community restructuring for local resilience and ecological stewardship as a natural response to the combination of peak oil and climate change.
Criticism
General arguments
The top oil theory is controversial and became an issue of political debate in the US and Europe in the mid-2000s. Critics argue that the newly discovered oil reserves prevent the peak oil event. Some argue that oil production from new oil reserves and existing fields will continue to rise at a rate that exceeds demand, until alternative energy sources for the current fossil fuel dependence are found. In 2015, analysts in the petroleum and financial industry claim that the "oil age" has reached a new stage where excess supply that emerges by the end of 2014 may continue. A consensus has emerged that the parties to the treaty will introduce measures to limit the combustion of hydrocarbons in an attempt to limit global temperature rise to a nominal 2 à ° C that scientists are expected to limit environmental damage to tolerable levels.
Another argument against the peak oil theory is the decrease in demand from various options and technologies that replace oil. US federal funding to develop algae fuel has increased since 2000 due to rising fuel prices. Many other projects are funded in Australia, New Zealand, Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere as well as private companies entering the field.
Oil industry representative
Royal Dutch Shell operations president John Hofmeister, meanwhile, agreed that conventional petroleum production would soon begin to decline, criticizing Matthew Simmons' top oil theory analysis for "too much focus on one country: Saudi Arabia, the world's largest exporter and producer of OPEC swings." Hofmeister pointing large reserves on the continental shelf outside of the US, which stores about 100 billion barrels (16 ÃÆ'â ⬠10 9 m 3 ) from oil and natural gas. However, only 15% of these reserves are currently exploitable, mostly offshore Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Hofmeister also points to an unconventional oil source such as Canadian oil sands, where Shell is active. Canadian oil sand - a natural combination of sand, water, and oil found mostly in Alberta and Saskatchewan - is believed to contain one trillion barrels of oil. Another trillion barrels are also said to be terp terp
Source of the article : Wikipedia