Delta Air Lines Flight 1141 is a scheduled domestic passenger flight between Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas and Salt Lake City, Utah. On August 31, 1988, the flight, operated by the Boeing 727, crashed on takeoff, killing 14 of 108 people on it, and injuring 76 others.
Video Delta Air Lines Flight 1141
Engage
Planes
The aircraft is Boeing 727-200 Advanced, N473DA registration, three-engined jet aircraft. It was delivered to Delta Air Lines in November 1973, and was the Boeing 727's 992 to be produced. The aircraft is powered by three Pratt & amp; Whitney JT8D-15 turbofan machine. The aircraft had recorded more than 43,000 flight hours before the accident.
Crew
The crew consisted of Captain Larry Davis, 48; First Officer Wilson Kirkland, 37; and Flight Engineer Steven Judd, 31. The cabin crew consisted of four flight attendants: Dixie Dunn, 56, Diana George, 40, Rosilyn Marr, 43, and Mary O'Neill, 57.
Maps Delta Air Lines Flight 1141
Crash
Flight 1141 is a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Jackson Municipal Airport in Jackson, Mississippi to Salt Lake City International Airport in Salt Lake City, Utah, with an intermediate stop at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) in North Texas. The flight from Jackson to DFW went smoothly, and Flight 1141 arrived at DFW at 7:38 pm Central Daylight Time. For flights from DFW to Salt Lake City, Flight 1141 has 101 passengers and 7 crew in it.
At 08:30, Flight 1141 departed from the gate at DFW and emptied by a ground controller to the 18L runway. The aircraft is instructed to line up on the runway and hold for one minute because of the possible turbulence of the other Delta Air Lines 727 departing. The crew requested an extension of up to two minutes. The crew spoke to the stewardess for a while about the fall of Continental Airlines 1713 and what they would say to the cockpit recorder if they fell. Finally this chat stopped because the crew was released to take off. The takeoff was normal until the main wheel left the ground, at which time the plane started a loud rolling motion and the right wing fell. The tail of the plane made contact with the runway briefly, and 650 feet (200 m) later, the right wing tip hit the runway. The aircraft develops a compressor wave (due to interruption of airflow through the engine), and can not gain altitude or maintain a stable flight. About 900 feet (270 m) beyond the end of the 18L runway, the right wing of the plane hit the localizer antenna of ILS, which set the wings on fire and caused it to begin crashing while the plane is still in flight. The aircraft remained in the air for 400 feet (120 m) before crashing into the ground, sliding sideways and leaving a trail of 800 feet (240 m) of debris long before it finally came to a 3,200 foot (980 m) break from the end of the runway. The fire erupted in the right wing area and quickly spread and swallowed the rear of the plane. Total flight time is 22 seconds, from appointment to first land impact.
Victim
Two of the four flight attendants and 12 of the 101 passengers on board were killed in the crash. The medical examination stipulates that all but one casualty is due to smoke inhalation. One passenger, who had managed to get off the plane, tried to reenter the plane to help his wife and other passengers still trapped inside; he suffered severe burns and died 11 days after the accident due to his injuries.
Captain Davis, First Officer of Kirkland, two cabin crew members, and 22 passengers seriously injured. Judd Flight Engineers and 49 passengers received minor injuries. 18 passengers received no injuries. Many passengers reported that the impact force was not severe and mostly concentrated to the rear of the aircraft. Captain Davis was wedged between his seat and the instrument panel and had to be released by the rescue crew (because of this, he was the last person out of the plane, about 45 minutes after the accident). He suffered a severe bone fracture to the ribs and spine which required surgery. First Officer Kirkland is very bruised and has a concussion.
Investigation
The National Transportation Safety Council (NTSB) investigated the accident.
Airplane performance
NTSB seeks to reconstruct aircraft performance based on reports from witnesses and victims. Witnesses reported that the plane was trying to climb at a higher angle than usual, and that the plane was rolling from side to side and seemed out of control. Based on the scrap inspection, the NTSB decided that a collision with a localizer antenna system of approximately 900 feet (270 m) beyond the end of the 18L grounding led to the outbreak of the aircraft. Jet fuel leaked from a fire that quickly swallowed the plane. Machine # 3 apart from empennage. Passengers reported that the aircraft seemed to shake violently during takeoff. Witnesses on the ground claimed that one of the engines was on fire, but although the engine was badly damaged by the impact of the soil, there was no sign of fire or heat damage. Delta officials quickly reacted to the question of operating and maintenance conditions 727 by pointing out that the original factory machinery from 1973 (when the aircraft was originally purchased by the airline) has been replaced in recent years by new models that run more slowly and use less fuel. They also state that there are no known mechanical or maintenance problems with the aircraft before the flight (the vibrations reported by passengers are the surge of the compressors mentioned above).
NTSB checks why the plane can not climb as soon as it leaves the runway. After conducting a performance study of the aircraft, the NTSB determined that the Flight 1141 event could only be explained by the aircraft attempting to take off without a flap and the blades extended to the proper take-off configuration. The instability of the plane and suddenly rolling to the right is consistent with the known performance of the Boeing 727 with the flap and the bar being pulled back. The captain continues to pull back the control column in an attempt to keep the nose of the plane up, which creates turbulence over the engine mounted behind and causes a compressor surge. However, the NTSB concludes that the compressor spikes will not significantly reduce the engine impulse, and that the faulty aircraft to gain speed is due to the aerodynamic obstacles on the aircraft due to high attack angles, rather than the loss of engine impulse.. The NTSB inspects the CVR and notes that neither the pilot is inaudible to announce the spread of flaps or blades, nor is there a flap lever movement. The NTSB considers it highly unlikely that a pilot will move flaps or blades without announcing their actions to the other crew. Based on the failure of the aircraft to climb at the take-off speed, the instability of the roll, and the absence of sounds indicating flaps or blades deployed, the NTSB decided that the aircraft failure to rise was caused by crew failure to distribute flaps and blades as required by the pre-flight checklist.
Based on the absence of voice warnings on the CVR, NTSB also specifies that the aircraft takeoff alert system (TOWS), designed to alert the crew of the aircraft if the engine is strangled to take power without flaps and properly tuned bars. , failed to alert the pilot to their improper take-off configuration. Switches operating the TOWS on an earlier incident aircraft have been modified, in accordance with Boeing's instructions, to prevent disruption of activation during aircraft flight. An inspection of the Boeing 727 fleet, ordered by the Federal Aviation Administration after the Flight 1141 crash, identified 35 anomalies in the TOWS of 1,190 aircraft examined. The FAA has recommended that the Boeing 727 TOWS be converted from a system that is activated by a plane throttle into one powered by the engine pressure ratio (EPR), and while Delta is owned by Boeing 727 which has EPR-enabled TOWS, these are all aircraft that Delta has acquired from other airlines, and Delta does not change its own aircraft into an EPR-enabled system. NTSB concludes that TOWS is not enabled because it has intermittent problems that are undetected or corrected during the last maintenance action of the aircraft.
Crew and airline performance
NTSB investigates the relationship between crew performance and incidents in the crash. The FAA rules require a sterile cockpit before takeoff, which means no conversations unrelated to the plane and the flight being delayed. However, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded an extensive unnecessary conversation, including the CVR itself, the Continental Flight 1713 flight crash, and the dating habits of the flight attendants. The CVR also showed that before taking off, the crew was disturbed by chatting with a flight attendant about the upcoming presidential election, mixed drinks, and other topics unrelated to the operation of the aircraft. From the flight crew, the first officers were most actively involved in this insignificant conversation, with the captain merely joining occasionally. However, while the captain is not actively participating in this irrelevant conversation, he also fails to stop repeated interruptions of first officials and conversations with the flight attendant. The NTSB determines that, if the captain has taken a more active role in managing the cockpit, the accident may have been prevented.
Shortly after the NTSB hearing on which the CVR transcript was discussed, Captain Davis and First Officer Kirkland were fired from the Delta. However, the airline itself is also blamed. The NTSB determined that Delta did not insist on standard cockpit management, and that flight crews were allowed to gain significant latitude in their cockpit operations. This weak corporate philosophy contributes to the poor discipline and flight crew performance of Flight 1141. NTSB also found that the FAA has already realized the shortcomings in Delta operations regarding flightcrew performance, but neither Delta nor FAA has taken sufficient corrective action to eliminate known performance deficiencies at between Delta flight crew.
Possible causes and disagreements
On September 26, 1989, the NTSB published an eventual accident report. In it, the NTSB finally determined that there were two possible causes of the accident: (1) inadequate cockpit discipline resulting in the failure of the crew to extend the flap and the plane blades to the proper take-off configuration, and (2) the failure of the TOWS aircraft to sound and warned the crew that their plane was not configured properly for take off. Contributing to the accident was the slow implementation of the Delta against changes to the crew management program, the lack of FAA's aggressive enough action to force Delta to correct the known deficiencies, and the lack of adequate accountability in the FAA aircraft carrier inspection process.
One member of the security council, Jim Burnett, disagrees with the statement because of the possibility of NTSB. While Burnett agrees with the facts and findings of an accident report, he believes that the actions of the FAA and Delta are the direct cause of the accident and not just the contributing factors. Burnett's dissent suggests possible possible cause statements that include two possible causes mentioned in the main report, while adding a third possible cause:
"Also the cause of the accident was Delta Air Lines management's failure to provide leadership and guidance to the flight crew through training and checking pilot programs to promote and grow optimal cockpit management procedures, and the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration to correct known deficiencies in training and examination Delta Air Lines aviator program. "
Aftermath
The media broadcast of the CVR cassette, which shows why the crew failed to extend the flap or airplane blade to take off, provoked such protests by the pilot that subsequent releases of CVR data had been restricted by law and were carefully examined by NTSB. The law prohibits NTSB from generally releasing transcripts or CVR records; while the exception allows NTSB to release transcripts related to the safety investigation, there are no exceptions that allow NTSB to release a copy of the actual recording.
Dramatization
The collision was featured in the third episode of the May 18 Season (Air Accident Investigation). This episode is titled "Deadly Distraction".
See also
- British European Airways Flight 548
- LAPA Flight 3142
- Lufthansa 540 Flight
- Flight of Mandala Airlines 091
- Northwest Airlines Flight 255
- Spanair Flight 5022
References
External links
- NTSB report
- Air Disaster in Flight 1141 page
- Cockpit Voice Recording from 1141
- Flight crash 1141/Crash evokes memories of 1985
Source of the article : Wikipedia
0 Comments